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Abstract
I show that firms price almost competitively and consumers can infer product
quality from prices in markets where firms differ in quality and production cost,
and learning prices is costly. Bankruptcy risk or regulation links higher quality to
lower cost. If high-quality firms have lower cost, then they can signal quality by
cutting prices. Then the low-quality firms must cut prices to retain customers.
This price-cutting race to the bottom ends in a separating equilibrium in which
the low-quality firms charge their competitive price and the high-quality firms
charge slightly less.
Keywords: Price signalling, Diamond paradox, price dispersion, incomplete
information, price war.
JEL classification: D82, C72, D41.
In many markets, looking up prices is costly for consumers. Even in online markets,
the few moments it takes to check a (second) website constitutes a positive cost. Firms
usually have private information about their cost and quality. This paper shows that
with negatively related private cost and quality, firms set a price that is perfectly
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competitive or close to it. The negative association of cost and quality can arise from
several causes. A more skilled tradesperson or a firm with better equipment can provide
higher-quality service with less time and effort, thus at a lower cost. Examples are tire
change and rotation using a specialised machine versus ‘by hand’, ironing a shirt using
a dummy (e.g. Siemens Dressman) extruding hot air, measuring distance with a laser
rangefinder instead of tape. Economies of scale imply a lower marginal cost for larger
producers, and learning by doing improves their quality. For example, a larger insurer
is less risky (better for policyholders) and has lower overhead costs per policy.1 Amazon
has greater variety, faster delivery and a lower cost per package delivered than smaller
online sellers.
Regulation can cause a low-quality firm to have a higher cost. If a low-quality firm’s
product is more likely to be faulty and a regulator punishes firms for faulty products,
then a low-quality firm has a greater cost (of production plus expected punishment)
per product sold. Consumer lawsuits over bad quality have a similar effect. Regulation
can also turn a low cost into an incentive to improve quality. A low-cost firm optimally
prices lower than a high-cost one. If there is no quality difference, then demand is
greater for a low-cost firm. If a regulator checks firms with a larger market share more
often and punishes bad quality, then larger producers (those with lower cost) have a
greater incentive to improve quality. Higher quality further increases demand for a
low-cost firm.
Optimal allocation of managerial talent (or some other resource) between cost re-
duction and quality improvement also links lower cost to higher quality. Improving
quality is subject to moral hazard, because consumers pay based on the quality they
expect, not the quality that the firm chooses. Cost reduction benefits the firm directly,
so it is optimal to reduce cost maximally before improving quality. If managerial talent
differs between firms, then those with high talent reduce their cost to a minimum and
then might as well improve quality. The low-talent firms stay above the minimal cost
and don’t improve quality.
In the markets studied in this paper, there are at least two firms, each of which
draws an independent type, either good or bad. The good type has lower marginal
1Warren Buffett’s 2014 letter to shareholders (http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html)
p. 11 describes the higher underwriting profit, lower cost and smaller risk of default of Berkshire
Hathaway insurance businesses relative to competitors.
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cost and higher quality than the bad. Each firm knows its own type. The consumers
and the other firms only have a common prior over a firm’s type. First the firms
simultaneously set prices. Second, each consumer observes the price of one firm for free
and chooses either to buy from this firm, leave the market or pay a small cost to learn
the price of another firm. Finally, each consumer who learned chooses either to buy
from one of the firms whose price he knows or leave the market. The consumers have a
distribution of valuations. A higher-valuation consumer values high quality relatively
more. Consumers update their beliefs about the type of a firm whose price they see using
Bayes’ rule whenever possible. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE). A unique equilibrium remains after refining with the Intuitive Criterion.
In equilibrium, prices are close to competitive due to a race to the bottom that
consists of two forces. One is downward price signalling, i.e. the high-quality firm
reduces price to distinguish itself from the low-quality firm and attract greater demand.
The second force is that a low-quality firm cuts price to deter consumers from leaving.
The low-quality firms are in Bertrand competition over the consumers who learn more
than one price, which all consumers do when faced with a price indicative of a low-
quality firm.
The race to the bottom ends when the high-quality firm prices at the marginal
cost of the low-quality firm. The low-quality firm’s price is its marginal cost plus the
minimal monetary unit—the same as under complete-information Bertrand competition
between two low-quality firms when the consumers have zero learning cost. Bertrand
competition between two known high-quality firms leads to a lower price than under
incomplete information, but between a known high-quality and low-quality firm to a
higher price. The close-to-competitive pricing contrasts with the paradoxical result of
Diamond (1971) that without uncertainty about the costs and qualities of the firms,
the unique equilibrium features monopoly pricing and no consumer learning.
Competition with privately known cost and quality also contrasts with monopoly
under private information, and with competition when quality is observed together with
the price. In monopoly, the good type still signals its quality by reducing its price to
a level less profitable for the bad type than the bad type’s monopoly price. However,
the bad type has no incentive to cut price below its monopoly price.
In competition when paying a learning cost leads to observing both price and qual-
ity, the low-quality firms are still in a Bertrand-like situation and compete to a low
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price. However, a high-quality firm has no incentive to reduce price to signal, because
customers stay at a high-quality firm even at a high price. The combination of compe-
tition and unobservable firm characteristics is thus necessary for competitive pricing,
as well as sufficient.
Empirical evidence for the model can be found in the car industry, namely that
high-quality cars have a lower price and production cost. According to Vasilash (1997),
the assembly cost of more reliable cars is smaller, controlling for vehicle category, e.g.
subcompact, compact, etc. The rank correlation between the price2 and the CarMD
index3 of repair incidents (higher index means more breakdowns) is positive, but sta-
tistically insignificant in the sample of 40 cars that belong to both the top 288 new
cars by number sold in the US in 20154 and the 100 most reliable in 2015 according to
CarMD. The average cost per repair is also larger for more expensive cars according to
CarMD, but this is less surprising, because parts for more expensive vehicles cost more.
The cheapest cars to maintain according to YourMechanic5 are those of East Asian
manufacturers, with Toyota leading. These are also the cheapest to buy according to
the US News & World Report.
Given the above, it is not surprising that the per-car profits are higher for Toyota
than for Detroit’s Big 3 automakers (Wayland, 2015). Competition has resulted in
approximately zero profit for the higher-cost manufacturers. For example, the US
government had to bail out Detroit’s Big 3 carmakers during the 2008 financial crisis.
Price close to marginal cost (profit close to zero) for low-quality producers is consistent
with the model. The almost zero correlation of price and quality also corresponds to
the model, because the prices of producers of different quality are close to each other
in equilibrium.
Literature
The foremost paper on costly learning of prices is Diamond (1971), where competing
firms set the monopoly price. A monopoly price or above is also found in Diamond
(1987); Axell (1977); Reinganum (1979); Klemperer (1987) and Garcia et al. (2017).
2The price used is the average of the average low and high price paid from the US News & World
Report Car Ranking and Advice https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/. Author’s calculations.
3https://www.carmd.com/wp/vehicle-health-index-introduction/2015-carmd-manufacturer-vehicle-rankings/
4http://www.goodcarbadcar.net/2015/07/usa-20-best-selling-cars-june-2015-sales-figures.html
5https://www.yourmechanic.com/article/the-most-and-least-expensive-cars-to-maintain-by-maddy-martin
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A number of solutions to the Diamond paradox have been proposed. With a positive
fraction of consumers having zero learning cost, as in Butters (1977); Stahl (1996);
Klemperer (1987) and Benabou (1993), firms put a positive probability on the compet-
itive price. A similar idea to zero learning cost is that consumers observe multiple prices
with positive probability, for example by seeing price advertisements (Salop and Stiglitz,
1977; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Robert and Stahl, 1993). If consumers have private
taste shocks, then that generates search and below-monopoly pricing (Wolinsky, 1986;
Anderson and Renault, 1999; Zhou, 2014). Prices below the monopoly level also occur
with repeat purchases, as in Salop and Stiglitz (1982); Bagwell and Ramey (1992).
The current paper does not rely on zero learning cost, multiple free price observa-
tions, taste shocks or repeat purchases. To the author’s knowledge, this work is the
first to combine signalling and consumer search costs. The informative price difference
between firm types endogenously gives consumers the incentive to learn, in contrast
with the exogenous incentive created by taste shocks or a zero search cost. Multiple
free price observations constitute exogenous learning, also differing from an endogenous
motivation to learn. In the current work, the incentive for firm types to set different
and low prices is endogenous, driven by consumer beliefs responding to the price. This
differs from Salop and Stiglitz (1982) where firms are indifferent between selling two
units at a lower price or one unit at a higher, and these prices are determined by the
exogenous willingness to pay of consumers. In Bagwell and Ramey (1992), the motiva-
tion for a low price is that in the infinitely repeated game, consumers start to boycott
firms that raise price. This motivation is endogenous, but different from the current
paper.
Downward6 price signalling by a single firm has been studied in Shieh (1993). A
similar idea is in Simester (1995), where multiproduct firms (whose prices for all prod-
ucts are positively correlated) signal by a low price on one product. In Rhodes (2015),
a multiproduct monopolist stocking more products (better for the consumers) charges
lower prices. The result is similar to a higher-quality firm charging less, but the mech-
anism is different: adding a product attracts additional customers with relatively low
valuations for the other products. When the average valuation of customers falls, the
monopoly price falls.
6As opposed to the upward price signalling (higher-quality firm sets a higher price) studied by the
large literature following Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
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The receivers of the price signal are the consumers in this paper, which differs from
limit pricing (as in Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and the literature following) where the
receivers are potential entrants.
The next section sets up the model. Section 2 constructs an equilibrium with near-
competitive pricing in a market with consumer search costs. and shows that this equi-
librium is the unique one that survives the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).
The robustness of the results to relaxing various assumptions is discussed in Section 3.
1 Price competition with costly learning of prices
There are two firms indexed by i ∈ {X, Y }, each with a type θ ∈ {G,B} (good and
bad, respectively). Each firm knows its own type, but not that of the other. Types are
i.i.d. with Pr(G) = µ0 ∈ (0, 1). There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1 with types
v ∈ [0, v] distributed according to the strictly positive continuous pdf fv, with cdf Fv,
independently of firm types. Firms and consumers know their own type, but only have
a common prior belief over the types of others.
The timeline of the game is as follows.
1. Nature draws independent types for firms and consumers, and assigns half the
consumers to one firm, half to the other, independently of types. Each player
observes his own type, but not the types of the others.
2. Firms simultaneously set prices.
3. Each consumer observes the price of his assigned firm and chooses either to buy
from this firm, learn the price of the other firm, or leave the market.
4. Each consumer who chose to learn observes both firms’ prices and chooses either
to buy from his assigned firm, buy from the other firm, or leave the market.
A type G firm has marginal cost cG normalised to 0, and type B has cB > 0. The
quality of a type G firm is higher. Specifically, a type v consumer values firm type B’s
product at v and G’s product at h(v) ≥ v, with h′ > 1, h(v) < ∞. To ensure that
demand for B’s good is positive, assume v > cB. Consumers and firms are risk-neutral.
Each consumer has unit demand.
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After the firms’ cost and quality are determined, the firms simultaneously set prices
PX , PY ∈ SP := {0, m, 2m, . . . , Nm}, where m > 0 is the smallest monetary unit.
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Assume cB = km ≥ h(0) − m for some k ∈ N (costs are measured in terms of the
minimal monetary unit, and not all consumers buy at a price just below the bad type’s
cost). Assume Nm ≥ h(v). Prices above Nm are unavailable w.l.o.g., because no
consumer buys at any P > h(v).
For a set S, denote the set of probability distributions on S by ∆S. A behavioural
strategy of firm i is σi : {G,B} → ∆SP , so σi(θ)(P ) is the probability that type θ of
firm i puts on price P .
A consumer sees the price that his assigned firm sets and can learn the price of the
other firm at cost cℓ > 0. Define c
+
B := cB +m. Assume that cℓ ≤ µ0(h(c
+
B)− cB), i.e.
the learning cost is small relative to the prior probability of the good type firm and
the valuation difference between consumer type c+B for a good type firm and consumer
type cB for a bad type firm. Assume that m < min{cℓ,
µ0cB
1−µ0
, v − cB}, i.e. the minimal
monetary unit is small relative to the costs, the prior, and the maximal valuation for the
bad type. The cost difference cB−0 between the types, as well as the quality difference
h(0)− 0 may be small, provided the learning cost and minimal monetary unit are even
smaller.
After seeing the price of his assigned firm, a consumer decides whether to buy from
this firm (denoted b), learn the other firm’s price (ℓ) or not buy at all (n). Upon
learning the price of the other firm, the consumer decides whether to buy from firm X
(denoted bX), firm Y (bY ) or not buy at all (nℓ). A consumer’s behavioural strategy
consists of σ1 : [0, v] × SP → ∆ {b, n, ℓ} and σ2 : [0, v] × S
2
P → ∆ {bX , bY , nℓ}, so that
e.g. σ2(v, Pi, Pj)(bj) is the probability that a consumer type v initially at firm i buys
from j 6= i after learning Pj .
A type θ firm’s ex post payoff if mass D of consumers buy from it at price P is
(P−cθ)D. Assume that the full-information monopoly profit function P [1−Fv(h
−1(P ))]
of firm typeG strictly increases in P on [0, cB+m], so that the full-information monopoly
price PmG of G is strictly above cB (this is relaxed in Section 3).
A consumer’s posterior belief about firm i after observing its price Pi and expecting
7 Using a discrete price grid avoids problems with equilibrium existence (explained in Section 3),
which are not the focus of this paper. An alternative to the grid is to restrict prices to R+\(cB−ρ, cB+ρ)
for some ρ > 0.
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the firm to choose strategy σ∗i is
µi(Pi) :=
µ0σ
∗
i (G)(Pi)
µ0σ∗i (G)(Pi) + (1− µ0)σ
∗
i (B)(Pi)
(1)
whenever µ0σ
∗
i (G)(Pi) + (1 − µ0)σ
∗
i (B)(Pi) > 0, and arbitrary otherwise. The gain
from trade that consumer type v expects from buying from firm i at price P is denoted
w(v, i, P ) := µi(P )h(v) + (1− µi(P ))v − P .
The solution concept used is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), hereafter simply
called equilibrium. Later, a unique equilibrium is selected using the Intuitive Criterion
of Cho and Kreps (1987).
Definition 1. An equilibrium consists of σ∗X , σ
∗
Y , σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2 and µX , µY : SP → [0, 1] satis-
fying the following for θ ∈ {G,B}, v ∈ [0, v], i, j ∈ {X, Y }, i 6= j:
(a) if w(v, i, Pi) ≥ max {0, w(v, j, Pj)}, then σ
∗
2(v, Pi, Pj)(bi) = 1, and if in addition
w(v, i, Pi) > w(v, j, Pj), then σ
∗
2(v, Pj, Pi)(bi) = 1,
(b) if max {w(v, i, Pi), w(v, j, Pj)} < 0, then σ
∗
2(v, Pi, Pj)(nℓ) = 1,
(c) if w(v, i, Pi) > max{0,
∑
Pj∈SP
max{w(v, i, Pi), w(v, j, Pj)}[µ0σ
∗
j (G)(Pj) + (1 −
µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(Pj)]− cℓ}, then σ
∗
1(v, Pi)(b) = 1,
(d) if w(v, i, Pi) ≤
∑
Pj∈SP
max{0, w(v, i, Pi), w(v, j, Pj)}[µ0σ
∗
j (G)(Pj)+(1−µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(Pj)]−
cℓ ≥ 0, then σ
∗
1(v, Pi)(ℓ) = 1,
(e) if max{w(v, i, Pi),
∑
Pj∈SP
max{0, w(v, j, Pj)}[µ0σ
∗
j (G)(Pj)+ (1−µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(Pj)]−
cℓ} < 0, then σ
∗
1(v, Pi)(n) = 1,
(f) if σ∗i (θ)(Pi) > 0, then Pi ∈ argmaxP∈SP (P − cθ)Di(P ), where
Di(P ) :=
1
2
∫ v
0
∑
Pj∈SP
{σ∗1(v, P )(b) + σ
∗
1(v, P )(ℓ)σ
∗
2(v, P, Pj)(bi) (2)
+ σ∗1(v, Pj)(ℓ)σ
∗
2(v, Pj, P )(bi)}[µ0σ
∗
j (G)(Pj) + (1− µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(Pj)]dFv(v),
(g) if σ∗i (G)(P ) > 0 or σ
∗
i (B)(P ) > 0, then µi(P ) is derived from (1).
The equilibrium profit of type θ of firm i is denoted π∗iθ; it equals (P − cθ)D(P ) for
any P s.t. σ∗i (θ)(P ) > 0.
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Some tie-breaking rules are built into the equilibrium definition, e.g. a consumer
indifferent between b and ℓ chooses ℓ. The results remain substantially the same if the
tie-breaking rules are modified, as discussed in Section 3. The next section construc-
tively proves equilibrium existence by guessing and verifying.
2 Equilibrium
This section constructs an equilibrium in which consumers put probability one on a
firm being the good type if the price is below the bad type’s cost, otherwise probability
one on the bad type. The good type firm sets a price equal to the bad type’s cost. The
bad type’s price is its cost plus m. A consumer initially facing a price less than the
bad type’s cost either buys (when his valuation for the good type is above the price)
or leaves the market. A consumer who initially sees a price strictly above the bad
type’s cost learns (when his expected valuation for the other firm is above cℓ) or leaves
the market. After learning, all consumers buy from the lower-priced firm or leave the
market.
The formal definition of the guessed equilibrium is the following:
1. Beliefs: P ≤ cB ⇒ µi(P ) = 1 and P > cB ⇒ µi(P ) = 0 for i ∈ {X, Y }.
2. Each firm’s type G sets price cB and type B sets c
+
B.
3. If µi(P ) = 1, then h(v) ≥ P ⇒ σ
∗
1(v, P )(b) = 1 and h(v) < P ⇒ σ
∗
1(v, P )(n) = 1.
4. If µi(P ) = 0 and µ0(h(v)− cB) + (1− µ0)(v− c
+
B)− cℓ ≥ 0, then σ
∗
1(v, P )(ℓ) = 1.
If µi(P ) = 0 and µ0(h(v)− cB) + (1− µ0)(v− c
+
B)− cℓ < 0, then σ
∗
1(v, P )(n) = 1.
5. If w(v, i, Pi) ≥ max {0, w(v, j, Pj)}, then σ
∗
2(v, Pi, Pj)(bi) = 1, and if in addition
w(v, i, Pi) > w(v, j, Pj), then σ
∗
2(v, Pj, Pi)(bi) = 1. If max {w(v, i, Pi), w(v, j, Pj)} <
0, then σ∗2(v, Pi, Pj)(nℓ) = 1.
Part 1 of the guessed equilibrium includes Definition 1(g) and also specifies beliefs at off-
path prices. Beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule (1). Part 2 specialises Definition 1(f)
to the guessed equilibrium. Parts 3–5 are simply the rewriting of Definition 1(a)–(e).
Appendix A proves that no player can profitably deviate from the guessed equilibrium.
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The idea of the proof is as follows. Consumers are clearly best responding to their
belief, which is consistent with firm strategies. The bad type does not price below cB,
because it is weakly dominated by c+B. If consumers at a bad type learn and the other
firm is the good type, then all consumers leave the bad type. Otherwise, the two bad
types are in Bertrand competition over the consumers who learn. So the bad types
undercut each other until pricing at c+B. A good type does not increase price above cB,
because the resulting fall in belief reduces expected profit below that obtained at price
cB. The reason is twofold. If the other firm is the good type, then all consumers leave.
If the other firm is the bad type, then no consumers are drawn away from that firm,
which would happen at price cB or below. At prices less than cB, the Diamond paradox
reasoning applies to the good types: each can raise its price to m above that of the
other without losing demand. This is because the consumers’ learning cost is above m,
so a price m higher than expected does not motivate them to learn and switch, unless
the price increase changes their belief.
The guessed equilibrium already partly resolves the Diamond paradox, because its
outcome differs from monopoly pricing and no search. Prices in the guessed equilib-
rium are close to competitive. Type B prices the same as under Bertrand competition
between the B types with zero search cost and complete information. Type G prices
below B. For a stronger resolution of the Diamond paradox, subsequent results will
show that the guessed equilibrium introduced above is the unique one that survives the
Intuitive Criterion. Without refinement, belief threats support other equilibria. For
example, for high enough µ0, both firms pool on c
+
B, justified by the belief µi(c
+
B) = µ0
and if P 6= c+B, then µi(P ) = 0.
The following lemma shows the monotonicity of equilibrium demand and prices.
Given the ranking of the costs and qualities of the types, the results are intuitive—
the lower-cost type G sets a lower price and the higher-quality type G receives higher
demand. Based on Lemma 1, there cannot be two prices on which both types put
positive probability and at one of which, demand is positive.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, if σ∗i (G)(PG) > 0 and σ
∗
i (B)(PB) > 0, then Di(PG) ≥
Di(PB), and if in addition 0 < Di(PB) ≤ Di(PG), then PG ≤ PB.
The proofs of this and subsequent results are in Appendix B.
The next lemma shows that in any equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion
in which not all consumers buy at price cB and belief µ0, neither firm sets a price at
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which demand is zero. Both types of both firms make positive profit, and the types
set different prices with positive probability. To state the lemma, define v(x) as the
(unique) consumer valuation v that satisfies µ0h(v) + (1− µ0)v = x, and define
m∗ := min
x∈[cB,µ0h(v)+(1−µ0)v−m]
x
(
1− Fv(h
−1(x))
1− Fv(v(x))
− 1
)
. (3)
The function 1−Fv(h
−1(·))
1−Fv(v(·))
is the ratio of demand at belief 1 to demand at belief µ0. This
function only depends on the primitives Fv, h, µ0, so m
∗ only depends on exogenous
parameters. The ratio of demands is strictly greater than 1 and continuous when the
denominator is positive (as is the case when x ≤ µ0h(v) + (1− µ0)v −m), so m
∗ > 0.
Lemma 2. For any m < m∗, i ∈ {X, Y } and θ ∈ {G,B}, in any equilibrium satisfying
the Intuitive Criterion, we have π∗iθ > 0 and there exists Pi ≥ c
+
B s.t. Di(Pi) > 0 and
σ∗i (B)(Pi) > 0 = σ
∗
i (G)(Pi).
Lemma 2 provides the first component of the race to the bottom, namely the good
types separating (at least partially) from the bad by setting a lower price. The Intuitive
Criterion drives the separation, because it eliminates belief threats at low prices, which
would otherwise deter the good types from price-cutting.
The next lemma establishes a lower bound on the equilibrium price by showing that
the good types price weakly above the cost of the bad type.
Lemma 3. For any m < m∗ and i ∈ {X, Y }, in any equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive
Criterion, if Pi < cB, then σ
∗
i (G)(Pi) = 0.
The intuition for Lemma 3 is that the firms’ good types are in a race to the top
at prices in [0, cB).
8 Neither firm’s good type loses customers to the other firm when
raising price slightly, because the small price difference does not motivate the customers
to pay the search cost. The reason that a good type does not increase price from cB to
c+B is that the bad type is choosing c
+
B, thus belief and demand are significantly lower
at c+B.
In the unique equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion, each good type sets
price cB and each bad type c
+
B, as shown in the following Theorem. The proof provides
the second component of the race to the bottom: a bad type reduces price to deter
8A similar race occurs in Diamond (1971) at all prices below the monopoly level.
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its customers from learning and to undercut the other firm’s bad type. The motive
for the customers to learn comes from the good types separating (the first component
of the race, Lemma 2), which makes the other firm’s price informative and smaller in
expectation than a bad type’s price.
Theorem 4. For any m < m∗ and i ∈ {X, Y }, in the unique equilibrium satisfying the
Intuitive Criterion, σ∗i (G)(cB) = 1 = σ
∗
i (B)(c
+
B).
Theorem 4 shows that the unique equilibrium outcome that satisfies the Intuitive
Criterion is the guessed equilibrium from above. Prices are close to competitive and
there is positive, but small price dispersion. The equilibrium outcome is robust to
changing the prior, the learning cost, the distribution of consumer valuations and the
good type’s cost in a range of parameters9 (Section 3 discusses cases outside that range).
The equilibrium in Theorem 4 is distinct from signalling by a monopoly, because a bad
type monopolist does not have an incentive to cut price when the good type’s price
is low enough. This is because there is no competing firm for the customers to learn
about and leave to. The bad type sets its monopoly price. Under the Intuitive Criterion,
Lemmas 1–3 still apply, so the good type monopolist sets a price between cB and P
m
G .
Separation from the bad type usually requires the good type’s price to be strictly below
PmG , so unobservable type has some of the same pro-competitive effect with one firm as
with two. However, more than one firm is needed for both types’ prices to be close to
competitive.
Section 3.1 below contrasts Theorem 4 with competition when the type is observed
together with the price. The comparisons to monopoly and observed type show that
the combination of signalling and multiple firms is necessary as well as sufficient to
overcome the effect of the positive search cost.
Bertrand competition under zero learning cost between two known bad or two known
good types leads to equal profits (close to zero) for the firms and no price dispersion,
unlike in the equilibrium in Theorem 4. Bertrand competition between a good and a
bad firm yields zero demand for the bad firm, but positive demand and profit for the
good firm, which sets a strictly higher price than the bad. This differs from the outcome
9The range defined by h(v) ≥ v, h′ > 1, h(v) < ∞, 0 < m < min{cℓ, v − cB,
µ0cB
1−µ0
, m∗},
cℓ ≤ µ0(h(c
+
B) − cB), cB = km ≥ h(0) − m > 0 for some k ∈ N,
d
dP
P [1 − Fv(h
−1(P ))] > 0 for
P ∈ [0, cB +m].
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in Theorem 4 where a firm that sets a strictly lower price is preferred by the consumers
and gets greater demand and profit.
If some consumers have zero and others positive learning cost, but there is no quality
or cost uncertainty, then the firms mix over an interval of prices between the competitive
and the monopoly price. The price distribution depends strongly on the density of the
learning costs at zero, and whether there is an atom at zero. In the current paper,
each firm sets a single price and the equilibrium is robust to perturbing the parameters
within a range.
With consumer taste shocks (horizontal differentiation of firms), there is no price
dispersion, and for each firm, some consumers initially at it learn another firm’s price
and leave. This differs from the current paper, which models vertical differentiation
and shows that consumers initially at a good firm do not learn or leave.
Models of repeat purchases have many equilibria, some of which replicate the pric-
ing patterns found in this paper. However, the markets described by repeated games
with high discount factors differ from the markets studied in this paper, which involve
infrequent buying (repair services, insurance, durable goods such as cars) and are thus
closer to one-shot interactions.
The next section relaxes some of the assumptions made above. The equilibrium
remains qualitatively similar, in particular the Diamond paradox is still resolved.
3 Robustness
Relaxing the assumption that the full-information monopoly price PmG of the good type
is above the cost of the bad type, the equilibrium price of the good type is either cB
as above (if PmG = cB), or P
m
G < cB. In the latter case, the only modification of the
equilibrium in Section 2 is that G sets price PmG ∈ (0, cB). The proofs simplify, because
G fully separates.
If the learning cost is large enough (cℓ > µ0[h(c
+
B) − cB]), then some customers
initially at a bad type setting price c+B buy immediately instead of learning the other
firm’s price. These customers are called captive.10 The mass of captive customers
depends on cℓ−µ0[h(c
+
B)−cB]. If this is large, then the bad type sets price P > c
+
B with
positive probability, because extracting more revenue from captive customers outweighs
10The captive customers correspond to the uninformed customers in Varian (1980).
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losing some non-captive ones to the competitor. The probability that the bad type
puts on P > c+B and the maximal Pˆ with σi(B)(Pˆ ) > 0 increase in the mass of captive
customers. As cℓ − µ0[h(c
+
B) − cB] increases, eventually the good type starts putting
positive probability on c+B. The qualitative features of the model are preserved, in that
price is lower than with complete information, and there is price dispersion.
If there is a distribution of learning costs with min cℓ > m and max cℓ ≤ µ0[h(c
+
B)−
cB], then the equilibrium outcome is unchanged. Learning costs strictly greater than
µ0[h(c
+
B)− cB] create captive consumers, as discussed above.
Nonpositive learning costs for some consumers eliminate the Diamond paradox even
without incomplete information, as the previous literature showed. In the current
model, enough consumers with a nonpositive learning cost make the good types reduce
price, but the positive probability of the other firm having a bad type ensures that the
good types do not reach zero price (their marginal cost). The customers initially at a
bad type are captive for the other firm’s good type.
If all consumers buy at price c+B and belief µ0 (formally, h(0) ≥ c
+
B/µ0), then there
is no reason for a good type to reduce price below c+B to increase belief. Both firms
pooling on P0 := max{P ∈ SP : P ≤ µ0h(0)} survives the Intuitive Criterion, because
if belief at any P1 > P0 is set to 1 and the good type wants to deviate to P1, then the
bad type also wants to deviate. If the bad, but not the good type wants to deviate to a
price, then the Intuitive Criterion sets belief at that price to 0, which deters deviations.
The results remain unchanged if the tie-breaking rule for σ2(v, Pi, Pj) in Defini-
tion 1 depends on the belief or the price, e.g. if µX(PX)h(v) + (1− µX(PX))v − PX =
µY (PY )h(v)+(1−µY (PY ))v−PY , then the customer buys from the firm with the greater
µi(Pi) (or smaller Pi) with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. The results also do not change if ties
are always broken in favour of a particular firm, say X . A slight change in equilibrium
is possible if the tie-breaking rule can depend on both the price and the firm, e.g. if both
firms set P = cB+2m, then ties are broken in favour of X , but if both set P = c
+
B, then
in favour of Y . In this case, the equilibrium features σX(B)(cB+2m) = 1 = σY (B)(c
+
B).
Firm Y ’s type B has no incentive to raise price, because then it would lose all customers.
If X cuts price to c+B, it still gets zero demand. The price at which trade occurs when
both firms are of type B is still c+B. Other parts of the equilibrium are unchanged.
A small asymmetry between firms has a similar effect to asymmetric tie-breaking.
Denote type θ of firm i by iθ. If consumers slightly prefer XB to Y B, other things
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equal (interpreted as Y B having lower quality), then Y B gets zero demand and profit at
equal price to XB, because consumers at iB learn. Then XB sets either the same price
as Y B, or higher by just enough to deter consumers from switching to Y B. Consumers
initially at a good type do not learn, unless the quality is lower or price higher than
that expected from the other firm’s good type, and the difference multiplied by the
prior outweighs the learning cost. If consumers do not learn, then they cannot switch
firms, so both firms’ good types set price cB, as before. Now suppose the firms have
the same quality, but the costs satisfy 0 = cXG ≤ cY G ≤ cXB ≤ cY B − m, and the
full-information monopoly price of Xθ is above cY θ. Then XB sets price cY B, because
all consumers at XB learn, so there is asymmetric Bertrand competition between XB
and Y B. Consumers at XG do not learn, so the price of XG is at least cY G. The good
types are in a race to the top, as in Section 2, so the good types set price cXB.
If the firms can set any price in [cB − ρ, cB + ρ] for some ρ > 0 (not constrained
to a grid), then an equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion does not exist. The
proofs of Lemmas 1–3 still work, but in Theorem 4, the bad types Bertrand compete
down to price cB. Then belief at cB is strictly lower than 1, the belief at any P < cB.
This makes the payoff of a good type drop discontinuously at cB, so a best response
of a good type does not exist. Without refining with the Intuitive Criterion, equilibria
exist, e.g. pooling on cB+ ǫ for ǫ ∈ (0, ρ) small. This is supported by zero belief for any
P 6= cB + ǫ.
Having more than two firms only strengthens competition. Because the bad types
do not set the weakly dominated price cB, and consumers initially at the good types
do not learn, pricing cannot get more competitive than with two firms. The outcome
is the same as in Section 2.
More than two types (with higher quality implying lower cost) are conceptually
similar to two, but notationally cumbersome. The worst type (highest cost, lowest
quality) behaves like B. In particular, the worst types undercut each other in Bertrand
fashion, until they price m above their cost. Consumers initially facing the worst type’s
price learn the price of the other firm, hoping to meet a better type with a lower price.
The Intuitive Criterion imposes (partial) separation of types, so the gain from learning
is positive. The best type acts similarly to G, setting a price equal to the second-best
type’s cost. The reason is a race to the top among the best types, as in the baseline
model. Types other than the worst and the best set prices between the second-best
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and the worst type’s cost and may mix, because customers who switch away from the
worst type of the other firm are captive for types other than the worst.
Two-dimensional types with combinations of cost and quality (cG, qˆG), (cG, qˆB),
(cB, qˆG) and (cB, qˆB) are similar to the two-type case when cost and quality are nega-
tively correlated. A type (cθ, qˆG) cannot separate from (cθ, qˆB) for any θ ∈ {G,B} in
any equilibrium, because (cθ, qˆB) can imitate any pricing strategy of (cθ, qˆG). The type
(cθ, qˆB) strictly prefers to imitate and get exactly the same payoff as (cθ, qˆG), because
demand is based on the quality that the consumers expect, given a price. Demand
is thus greater at prices set by (cθ, qG). The model with multidimensional types and
negative correlation of cost and quality thus reduces to the two-type model in Section 1,
with qθ = qˆG Pr(qˆG|cθ) + qˆB Pr(qˆB|cθ) for θ ∈ {G,B}.
If the correlation of cost and quality is positive, then the four-type model reduces to
the case of two types with higher cost implying higher quality. Price signalling is then
directed upward (the high-quality type sets a higher price). The race to the bottom
does not occur. Each type sets a price weakly greater than its monopoly price.
If the correlation of cost and quality is zero, then signalling is impossible in either
direction. Consumers expect the average quality after each price set in equilibrium and
each type of firm sets its monopoly price given the expected quality.
Suppose that the firms can advertise as well as signal by price. If ads reveal prices
to some consumers, then competition increases and the good types cut prices below cB.
The bad types still set price c+B. If all consumers see both firms’ prices, then the good
types Bertrand compete to price m.
If ads do not reveal prices, but are just wasteful signalling which for some reason is
cheaper for the good type, then the results depend on the noisiness, timing and cost of
the ads. If consumers cannot see the advertising expenditure, but must infer it from
noisily observed ad quality and quantity, then ads seen before the prices only change
the prior. The results are unaffected by the prior µ0 if µ0 > max{
m
m+cB
, cℓ
h(c+
B
)−cB
}. Ads
seen after the prices have no effect, because the prices already reveal the types. Even
if ads are free for the good type, the good type still signals by price, because ads are
noisy, so revealing the type via price discretely increases demand.
Suppose that ads are perfect signals of the money spent on them. Then the relative
cost to the types per unit of ads vs per unit of price decrease determines which signalling
channel the good type uses. If revealing the type via ads is relatively cheaper, then the
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good type sets its full-information monopoly price and signals using ads. If the ad costs
for the types are similar relative to the difference between the profits lost by cutting
price, then ads are not used and the outcome is the equilibrium found above. A similar
reasoning applies to any other way to signal, e.g. warranties, hiring independent quality
testers, etc.
If each firm trembles when setting price, and prices are the only way to signal,
then the results depend on the trembles. Denote by Pr(P1|P2) the probability that
the consumers see price P1 when the firm tries to set P2. A natural benchmark has
Pr(P1|P2) strictly decreasing in |P1 − P2|, and Pr(P1|P2) > 0 for all P1, P2 ∈ SP .
Reasoning similar to Lemma 1 shows that in any equilibrium, the good type tries to
set a lower price than the bad. Pooling cannot occur, because then the posterior belief
equals the prior at every price, motivating the good type to set a strictly smaller price
than the bad. If the trembles are small enough, i.e. Pr(P |P ) ≈ 1 for all P , then the
distinct prices of the types motivate the consumers to learn. This starts the race to the
bottom discussed in Section 2, leading to the same outcome.
3.1 Comparison to observable types
In this section, the only difference from Section 1 is that the type is not inferred from
the price, but seen directly. The consumers initially at firm i see the price and type
of firm i, but have to pay cℓ to learn the price and type of firm j. In such a market,
prices are not competitive, as shown below. The equilibrium definition omits part (g)
of Definition 1 and replaces µi(Pi) with 1 if firm i is of type G and 0 if B. The following
Proposition puts a lower bound on the price of type G.
Proposition 5. In any equilibrium with observable types, π∗iG > 0, and if σi(G)(P ) > 0,
then P ≥ min{PmG , h(c
+
B)−m} for i ∈ {X, Y }.
The idea for Proposition 5 is that race to the top between the good types now con-
tinues at prices above cB, as long as the profit increases in the price and consumers
initially at a good type do not learn. If the consumers learn, then with positive prob-
ability they switch to the other firm (otherwise there would be no reason to pay the
learning cost) and the good type loses demand. The prices of the good types stay close
to each other throughout the race to the top, so the motive for a consumer to learn is
to find a bad type of the other firm at a price low enough to compensate for the quality
17
difference and the learning cost. So the good types can price above c+B by at least the
quality difference plus the learning cost.
The race to the top may end at the good type’s monopoly price or below that. If
the race ends below PmG , then consumers initially at a good type learn and switch with
positive probability. The bad type then gets positive demand, even when pricing above
the other firm’s bad type. The captive customers of the bad type then motivate it to
raise price above c+B. In summary, if quality is seen together with the price, then either
the good type sets its monopoly price or both types set a price strictly greater than
with unobservable types.
4 Conclusion
The famous paradox of Diamond (1971) is that a market with multiple firms need not
be competitive if consumers have to pay a cost to learn the prices of firms. However,
as shown in the current paper, negatively correlated production cost and quality that
are private information restore competitive pricing. This result holds for a wide range
of quality and cost differences between firms. There are several mechanisms that make
cost and quality negatively correlated across firms, for example economies of scale,
regulation or differing managerial talent. These mechanisms operate in many markets.
Private information about cost and quality, as well as prices close to the competitive
level are empirically reasonable in skilled services, insurance and durable goods, among
others.
The previous literature resolves the Diamond paradox assuming either (a) zero learn-
ing cost for a positive fraction of consumers, (b) that consumers observe multiple prices
at once, (c) large private taste shocks, or (d) repeat purchases. The current paper
models markets in which a given consumer purchases rarely, e.g. cars, insurance, re-
pair services, and in which the vertical quality difference is more important than the
horizontal taste shock. The predictions of the current paper differ from zero search
costs and observing multiple prices at once, because the firms set deterministic prices
instead of mixing, and the mark-up and profit are larger for a lower-price firm. The
current paper assumes no repeat buying of the same good (insurance policies and car
models change by the time the consumer purchases a replacement), which distinguishes
the model from the literature on repeat purchases. With taste shocks, prices decrease
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in the number of firms and the degree of product differentiation. In the current paper,
prices stay constant when the number of firms rises above two or when the quality
difference changes within some bounds.
If lower cost implies higher quality, then a low-cost firm would like to tell consumers
about its cost level. A cheap talk message about low cost does not work, for the same
reason as cheap talk about high quality has little effect. On the other hand, a low price
is a credible signal, because it is differentially costly to the firm types. In some markets,
other costly signals are available, e.g. warranties or advertising. In other applications
like insurance, warranties are uncommon, so price signalling is more likely. Even if
feasible, signalling by ads or warranties may not be optimal, for example when price
signals are cheaper or more precise.
Signalling by a low price resembles limit pricing, in which an incumbent tries to
keep an entrant out of the market. The incumbent sets a low price to convince the
entrant that the incumbent has a low cost and is likely to start a price war. The low
price in limit pricing is anti-competitive. In the current work, the low price results
from competition, thus has different policy implications. A regulator maximising total
or consumer surplus should encourage the race to the bottom in prices, for example by
punishing low quality or checking the quality of a firm with a larger market share more
frequently.
A Verification of the guessed equilibrium
Consumers are clearly best responding to their beliefs in parts 3–5 of the guessed
equilibrium. Beliefs in part 1 are consistent with part 2. It remains to check whether
firms are best responding in part 2. First, downward deviations of type G are ruled
out. The preparative Lemma 6 derives the profit function of G from setting P ≤ cB.
Lemma 6. In the guessed equilibrium, the profit of a type G firm from P ≤ cB is
1
2
P
[
1− Fv(h
−1(P )) + (1− µ0)
∫ v
h−1(P )
σ∗1(v, c
+
B)(ℓ)dFv(v)
]
. (4)
Proof. The profit (4) is derived from (2) by substituting in the consumers’ strategies in
the guessed equilibrium: σ∗1(v, Pi)(b) = 1 and σ
∗
1(v, Pi)(ℓ) = 0 for consumers initially at
i, because Pi ≤ cB and µi(Pi) = 1. Consumers with v ≥ h
−1(Pi) buy from i, and they
are a fraction 1− Fv(h
−1(Pi)) of the mass of consumers initially at i.
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If firm j is type G, then σ∗1(v, Pj)(ℓ) = 0. With probability 1 − µ0, firm j is type
B, in which case consumer v at firm j learns Pi with probability σ
∗
1(v, c
+
B)(ℓ) and then
buys if v ≥ h−1(Pi).
Next, the technical Lemma 7 simplifies (4) by showing that if σ∗i (B)(c
+
B) = 1 and
σ∗i (G)(cB) = 1 for i ∈ {X, Y }, then σ
∗
1(v, c
+
B)(ℓ) is a step function increasing in v.
Lemma 7. For customers initially at a type B firm, there exists v01 ∈ [h
−1(cB), v] s.t.
σ∗1(v, c
+
B)(ℓ) = 0 for v < v01 and 1 for v > v01.
Proof. Denote the type B firm by i. Due to Pj ≤ c
+
B, in Definition 1(d), v − c
+
B may
be dropped under the max w.l.o.g. If
∑
Pj∈SP
max{0, w(v, j, Pj)}[µ0σ
∗
j (G)(Pj) + (1 −
µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(Pj)]− cℓ ≥ 0, then the inequality is strict for all vˆ > v.
If w(v, j, Pj) ≤ 0, then v − c
+
B < 0, so the first inequality in Definition 1(d) holds.
If w(v, j, Pj) > 0, then 0 may be dropped under the max w.l.o.g. Then h
′ > 1
and
∑
Pj∈SP
[µ0σ
∗
j (G)(Pj) + (1 − µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(Pj)] = 1 imply that the first inequality in
Definition 1(d) is strict for all vˆ > v1. So if σ
∗
1(v, c
+
B)(ℓ) > 0, then for all vˆ > v,
σ∗1(vˆ, c
+
B)(ℓ) = 1. Taking v01 := inf
{
v : σ∗1(v, c
+
B)(ℓ) > 0
}
ensures that σ∗1(vˆ, c
+
B)(ℓ) = 0
for vˆ < v01 and 1 for vˆ > v01.
To prove v01 ≥ h
−1(cB), note that h
−1(x) < x ∀x, so h−1(cB) − c
+
B < 0. If
Pj ≥ cB, then w(h
−1(cB), j, Pj) ≤ 0. The −cℓ term in Definition 1(d) then ensures
σ∗1(h
−1(cB), c
+
B)(ℓ) = 0.
Downward deviations by a type G firm are ruled out in the following Lemma. After
that, the incentives of firm type B are discussed, and then the deviations of G to
PG > cB are ruled out.
Lemma 8. A type G firm’s best response to the strategies of other players in the guessed
equilibrium satisfies P ≥ cB.
Proof. Based on Lemma 7, σ∗1(v, c
+
B)(ℓ) = 0 for all v ≤ h
−1(cB) ≥ h
−1(P ), where
P ≤ cB. Therefore (4) reduces to
1
2
P [1 − Fv(h
−1(P )) + (1 − µ0)[1 − Fv(v01)]], with
v01 independent of P . The assumption P
m
G := argmaxP P [1 − Fv(h
−1(P ))] ≥ c+B then
implies argmaxP
1
2
P [1−Fv(h
−1(P ))+(1−µ0)[1−Fv(v01)]] ≥ c
+
B, because if P
m
G D(P
m
G ) ≥
PD(P ) for all P ≤ PmG , then for any D¯ > 0 and P ≤ P
m
G , we have P
m
G D(P
m
G )+P
m
G D¯ ≥
PD(P ) + PD¯. So type G optimally sets a price P ≥ cB.
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Lemma 9. In the guessed equilibrium, a type B firm’s best response to the strategies
of other players is P = c+B.
Proof. A type B firm clearly does not deviate to P ≤ cB, which is weakly dominated by
P = c+B. Consider B’s deviations to P > c
+
B. Parts 1 and 4 of the guessed equilibrium
ensure that each customer initially at a firm charging P ≥ c+B either does not buy or
learns the prices of both firms. If the other firm is type G, then by part 5 of the guessed
equilibrium, all customers leave a B firm. Therefore B sets a price that best responds
to facing B with certainty. If both firms are type B, then Bertrand competition leads
both to set price c+B.
Having ruled out deviations by B, the final step (Lemma 10) is to eliminate upward
deviations by a type G firm.
Lemma 10. A type G firm’s best response to the strategies of other players in the
guessed equilibrium satisfies P ≤ cB.
Proof. If a type G firm i sets P > c+B, then it gets zero demand in the guessed equi-
librium, because µi(P ) = 0 and the other firm j is expected to set price Pj ≤ c
+
B < P .
So P > c+B is not a profitable deviation. At P = c
+
B, belief is µi(P ) = 0 and demand
is 1−µ0
2
[1 − Fv(c
+
B)]. The profit of G is then c
+
B
1−µ0
2
[1 − Fv(c
+
B)], which is less than the
profit at P = cB iff c
+
B(1 − µ0)[1 − Fv(c
+
B)] ≤ cB[1 − Fv(cB) + (1 − µ0)[1 − Fv(v01)]].
Sufficient for this is m(1 − µ0) ≤ µ0cB, which holds by assumption.
Combining Lemmas 6–10, the guessed equilibrium is verified.
B Proofs omitted from the main text
Proof of Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, the incentive constraints (ICs) PGDi(PG) ≥
PDi(P ) and (PB−cB)Di(PB) ≥ (P−cB)Di(P ) hold for any P, PG, PB s.t. σ
∗
i (θ)(Pθ) > 0.
Demand and price are nonnegative and finite by definition. From (PB − cB)Di(PB) ≥
(PG− cB)Di(PG) and PGDi(PG) ≥ PBDi(PB), we get (PB − cB)Di(PB) ≥ PGDi(PG)−
cBDi(PG) ≥ PBDi(PB)− cBDi(PG), so Di(PB) ≤ Di(PG).
If 0 < Di(PB) ≤ Di(PG) and (PB − cB)Di(PB) ≥ (PG− cB)Di(PG), then PB − cB ≥
PG − cB, so PB ≥ PG.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that for both i ∈ {X, Y } there exists Pi0 s.t. Di(Pi0) = 0
and σ∗i (B)(Pi0) > 0. Then π
∗
iB = 0, otherwise B would deviate to put probability 1
on prices at which profit is positive. If Pi < v on or off the equilibrium path, then for
all v > Pi, w(v, i, Pi) > 0 and by Definition 1, σ
∗
1(v, Pi)(n) = 0 = σ
∗
2(v, Pi, Pj)(nℓ) =
σ∗2(v, Pj, Pi)(nℓ) for any Pj and i 6= j ∈ {X, Y }. Then for all v ∈ (Pi, v], σ
∗
1(v, Pi)(ℓ) +
σ∗1(v, Pi)(b) = 1 and σ
∗
2(v, Pi, Pj)(bi) + σ
∗
2(v, Pi, Pj)(bj) = 1, i.e. the consumer types
v ∈ (Pi, v] buy from some firm. Thus Di(Pi) +Dj(Pj) ≥ 1−Fv(Pi) > 0 for any Pj and
any Pi < v. With probability at least σ
∗
j (B)(Pj0) > 0, Dj(Pj) = 0 and Di(Pi) > 0 for
any Pi < v. Thus deviating from Pi0 to P ∈ (cB, v) yields positive expected profit to i,
contradicting σ∗i (B)(Pi0) > 0. Therefore in any equilibrium, type B of firm i only sets
prices at which profit is positive.
Because G can imitate σ∗(B) at a strictly lower cost, we have π∗iG ≥ π
∗
iB in any
equilibrium, with strict inequality if π∗iG > 0.
Next, the Intuitive Criterion is used to show that type B of firm i partially separates.
Suppose that if σ∗i (B)(Pi) > 0, then σ
∗
i (G)(Pi) > 0 (no separation of B). Lemma 1
implies that there is at most one P s.t. σ∗i (θ)(P ) > 0 for θ ∈ {G,B}. We supposed
that there is no Pˆ s.t. σ∗i (B)(Pˆ ) > 0 = σ
∗
i (G)(Pˆ ), so Pi is the unique price with
σ∗i (B)(Pi) > 0. Thus σ
∗
i (B)(Pi) = 1, which implies µi(Pi) ≤ µ0. From Di(Pi) > 0,
we get w(v, i, Pi) > 0. Define D
µ
i (P ) as demand for firm i when belief is fixed at
µi(P ) = µ ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly D
µ
i (P ) decreases in P and increases in µ. Define P¬B :=
{P ∈ SP : (P − cB)D
0
i (P ) < π
∗
iB > (P − cB)D
1
i (P )}, which is nonempty, because if
P ≤ cB, then P ∈ P¬B. If σ
∗
i (B)(P˜ ) > 0, then P˜ /∈ P¬B.
To apply the Intuitive Criterion, set µi(P ) = 1 for all P ∈ P¬B. Check whether
G wants to deviate to Pd := max{P ∈ P¬B : P < Pi} ≥ cB. By definition of P¬B
and SP , there exists Pn ∈ (Pd, Pi] (possibly equal to Pi) s.t. Pd − Pn ≤ m and (Pn −
cB)Di(Pn) ≥ π
∗
iB = (Pi − cB)Di(Pi). Focus on the minimal such Pn. The definition of
Pd implies Pn ≥ c
+
B. Due to π
∗
iG = PiDi(Pi) = π
∗
iB + cBDi(Pi), we have PnDi(Pn) ≥
π∗iB + cBDi(Pn) = π
∗
iG + cBDi(Pn)− cBDi(Pi).
Suppose Pn < Pi (implying Pd < Pi − m). Then due to (Pn − cB)Di(Pn) ≥
(Pi − cB)Di(Pi) = π
∗
iB, we have Di(Pn) > Di(Pi) and PnDi(Pn) ≥ π
∗
iG − cBDi(Pi) +
cBDi(Pn) > π
∗
iG, contradicting equilibrium. The remaining possibility is Pn = Pi (so
Pd = Pi −m).
If h(0) ≤ c+B (which holds by assumption) and µi(Pi) ≤ µ0, then a positive mass
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of consumers initially at i do not buy from i at Pi ∈ [c
+
B, h(v)] (consumer v = 0
strictly prefers not to). In that case, i reducing price to Pd and increasing belief to
µi(Pd) = 1 > µ0 ≥ µi(Pi) strictly increases total demand Di(·) + Dj(·) by at least
1
2
[1 − Fv(h
−1(Pd)) − 1 + Fv(v2)] > 0, where v2 solves w(v2, i, Pi) = 0. Demand weakly
increases as Pi falls, so D
1
i (Pd)−Di(Pi) ≥
1
2
[Fv(v2)− Fv(h
−1(Pd))] > 0.
If m < m∗ ≤
Pd[D
1
i (Pd)−Di(Pi)]
Di(Pi)
and Pi − Pd = m, then PdD
1
i (Pd) − PdDi(Pi) −
mDi(Pi) > 0, i.e. PdD
1
i (Pd) > PiDi(Pi) = π
∗
iG, contradicting equilibrium in the case
Pn = Pi. The Intuitive Criterion thus eliminates equilibria in which σ
∗
i (B)(Pi) > 0 ⇒
σ∗i (G)(Pi) > 0, pooling among them.
Because there exists Pi ≥ c
+
B s.t. Di(Pi) > 0 and σ
∗
i (B)(Pi) > 0 = σ
∗
i (G)(Pi),
we have µi(Pi) = 0 with probability at least σ
∗
i (B)(Pi) > 0. If either type of firm j
sets price Pj = c
+
B, then µj(Pj) ≥ µi(Pi) and Pj ≤ Pi with the positive probability
σ∗i (B)(Pi) > 0, so firm j makes positive profit.
Due to π∗jθ > 0, we can apply the Intuitive Criterion reasoning above to firm j to
prove that type B of firm j also separates at least partially.
Proof of Lemma 3. If m ≤ m∗, then by Lemma 2, π∗iθ > 0 for both i ∈ {X, Y } and
θ ∈ {G,B}. The Intuitive Criterion then implies µi(P ) = 1 for all P ≤ cB.
Suppose that PiG := min{P : σi(G)(P ) > 0} ≤ min{cB −m, min{P : σj(G)(P ) >
0}+cℓ}. If firm i raises price to PiG+m, then due to m < cℓ, consumers initially at firm
i still choose σ1(v, PiG+m)(ℓ) = 0. The customers at j who chose ℓ anticipating σ
∗
i (G)
do not know about the deviation, so still choose ℓ. Upon learning PiG +m, a customer
initially at j’s type B has a choice between B at PB ≥ c
+
B and G at PiG +m ≤ c
+
B, so
still buys from i. A customer initially at j’s type G still buys from i if PjG ≥ PiG+2m.
If PjG ∈ [PiG, PiG+m], then due to PiG ≤ cB−m and PB ≥ c
+
B, the type of j is revealed
as G.
A type v customer initially at j chooses σ∗1(v, P )(ℓ) = 1 only if h(v) − PjG ≤
µ0
∑
Pi∈SP
max{0, h(v) − Pi, h(v) − PjG}σ
∗
i (G)(Pi) + (1 − µ0)
∑
Pi∈SP
max{0, v −
Pi, h(v) − PjG}σ
∗
i (B)(Pi) − cℓ ≥ 0. From PiG ≤ PjG ≤ PiG + m < c
+
B, we get∑
Pi∈SP
max{0, h(v) − Pi, h(v) − PjG}σ
∗
i (G)(Pi) ≤ max{0, h(v) − PjG + m} and∑
Pi∈SP
max{0, v − Pi, h(v)− Pj}σ
∗
i (B)(Pi) ≤ max{0, h(v)− Pj}. Due to m < cℓ, if
PjG ∈ [PiG, PiG +m], then σj(v, PjG)(ℓ) = 0. The customers who might switch away
from i after a price increase do not learn both prices, so have no choice of switching.
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On P ≤ cB, the profit of G is then given by (4) and Lemmas 7–8 prove that
σ∗i (G)(Pi) = 0 for all Pi < cB.
Proof of Theorem 4. By Lemma 2, there exist Pi, Pj ≥ c
+
B s.t. Di(Pi) > 0, Dj(Pj) > 0,
σ∗i (B)(Pi) > 0 = σ
∗
i (G)(Pi) and σ
∗
j (B)(Pj) > 0 = σ
∗
j (G)(Pj). Choose the maximal
such Pi, Pj and assume Pi ≥ Pj w.l.o.g. Clearly µi(Pi) = 0 = µj(Pj). By Lemma 1, if
σ∗j (θ)(Pjθ) > 0, then PjG ≤ PjB, so if σ
∗
j (B)(Pj) > 0 = σ
∗
j (G)(Pj), then PjG < Pj ≤ Pi.
By Definition 1(d),(e), consumer v initially at firm i charging Pi chooses σ
∗
1(v, Pi)(b) =
0 if v − Pi ≤
∑
P∈SP
max{0, w(v, j, P ), v − Pi}[µ0σ
∗
j (G)(P ) + (1 − µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(P )] −
cℓ. W.l.o.g. v − Pi may be dropped under the max, due to P ≤ Pi. Sufficient for
σ∗1(v, Pi)(b) = 0 is then v−Pi+cℓ ≤
∑
P∈SP
[µj(P )h(v)+(1−µj(P ))v−Pi][µ0σ
∗
j (G)(P )+
(1−µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(P )], equivalently cℓ ≤
∑
P∈SP
µj(P )[h(v)−v][µ0σ
∗
j (G)(P )+(1−µ0)σ
∗
j (B)(P )].
This holds iff cℓ ≤ µ0[h(v)− v], due to Bayes’ rule (1) and
∑
P∈SP
σ∗j (θ)(P ) = 1.
Consumers v < Pi always choose σ
∗
1(v, Pi)(b) = 0. Due to Pi ≥ c
+
B, all consumers ini-
tially at firm i choose σ∗1(v, Pi)(b) = 0 if cℓ ≤ µ0[h(c
+
B)−c
+
B+m], i.e. cℓ ≤ µ0[h(c
+
B)−cB],
which holds by assumption. If all consumers at type B of firm i choose σ∗1(v, Pi)(b) = 0,
then B is in Bertrand competition with firm j’s type B over the consumers choosing
σ∗1(v, Pi)(ℓ) = 1. There is a positive mass of such consumers, because Di(Pi) > 0
by Lemma 2. If Pi > Pj, then σ
∗
2(v, Pi, Pj)(bi) = 0 = σ
∗
2(v, Pj, Pi)(bi), contradicting
Di(Pi) > 0.
If Pi = Pj > c
+
B, then deviating from Pi to the adjacent price Pd = Pi−m undercuts
firm j’s price Pj, increasing Di by at least Dj(Pj) > 0. If (Pi − cB)Di(Pi) < (Pd −
cB)[Di(Pd) + Dj(Pj)], then the deviation is profitable. Because Pi − cB = Pd + m −
cB ≥ 2m, we get Pi − cB ≤ 2(Pd − cB). Due to Pi = Pj , we can focus on either
firm, so assume Di(Pi) ≤ Dj(Pj) w.l.o.g. This with Pi − cB ≤ 2(Pd − cB) yields
(Pi − cB)Di(Pi) ≤ (Pd − cB)[Di(Pd) + Dj(Pj)]. Not all consumers buy at Pi > 0,
µi(Pi) = 0, so Pd < Pi and µi(Pd) ≥ µi(Pi) result in Di(Pd) > Di(Pi). Undercutting is
profitable at Pi = Pj > c
+
B, so if σ
∗
i (B)(P ) > 0, then P ≤ c
+
B.
If σ∗i (B)(c
+
B) > 0 = σ
∗
i (G)(c
+
B), then σ
∗
i (G)(cB) = 1 by Lemma 3. Finally, π
∗
iB > 0
implies σ∗i (B)(cB) = 0, so σ
∗
i (B)(c
+
B) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. Price m is available to type G, with Di(m) > 0 regardless of
σj , because m < cℓ. Therefore π
∗
iG > 0 for i ∈ {X, Y }.
Denote min{P : σ∗i (G)(P ) > 0} by PiG for i ∈ {X, Y } and assume w.l.o.g. PiG ≤
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PjG < h(v). A customer type v ≥ h
−1(PiG + m) initially at firm i who sees that the
firm is type G and charges PiG +m chooses σ
∗
1(v, PiG +m)(ℓ) = 0 if h(v)− PiG −m >
V := µ0
∑
Pj∈SP
max{h(v)−Pj, h(v)−PiG−m}σ
∗
j (G)(Pj) + (1−µ0)
∑
Pj∈SP
max{v−
Pj, h(v) − PiG − m}σ
∗
j (B)(Pj) − cℓ. Type B sets P ≥ c
+
B (which weakly dominates
P ≤ cB), firm j’s type G sets PjG ≥ PiG by assumption, and
∑
Pj∈SP
σ∗j (θ)(Pj) = 1, so
V ≤ µ0[h(v)−PiG]+ (1−µ0)max{v− c
+
B, h(v)−PiG−m}− cℓ. Sufficient for customer
type v ≥ h−1(PiG + m) facing PiG + m not to learn is (1 − µ0)[h(v) − PiG − m] >
µ0m−cℓ+(1−µ0)max{v−c
+
B, h(v)−PiG−m}, which holds if PiG+m < h
(
c+B +
cℓ−µ0m
1−µ0
)
So type G of firm i increases price to at least min{PmG , h(c
+
B)−m}.
Firm i was arbitrary, so the same reasoning applies to firm j.
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